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INTRODUCTION 
Following the end of the Gulf War in 1991, two major insurgencies erupted within Iraq. 
The Kurdish uprising received considerable attention (and support) within popular, 
academic and policy-making channels. The uprising among the Shia in the south, 
however, garnered less attention and certainly much less support. The outcomes of each 
movement also varied considerably; although not fully successful, the Kurdish movement 
did succeed in carving out some degree of autonomy for its area. On the other hand, the 
uprising in the South was crushed. This article is intended to describe the events in the 
Shia insurgency, the antecedents of the movement and prospects for the future.  
The Shia insurgency represents an interesting case in which one group of Muslims have 
used symbols and ideology from their branch of Islam to mobilize opposition to a 
different group of Muslims. Together with the cases of Iran and Lebanon, the Iraqi Shia 
insurgency also displays the important - verging on critical - role of the Shia religious 
establishment in Shia insurgent movements. Finally, this insurgency emphasizes the 
economic, social and political roots of popular dissatisfaction that can be mobilized using 
religious ideology.  
Beyond the religious elements of the Shia insurgent movement, several theoretical 
models of insurgency would suggest that Iraq was ripe for a popular uprising in 1991. It 
met both of Theda Skocpol's criteria of losing a major war and of facing sudden 
economic reversal.1 As will be discussed, the Shia population in Iraq certainly could be 
described as facing both relative and, in many cases, absolute deprivation.2 From the 
perspective of many Shia, there likely was a "rational actor" component; the best possible 
choice for securing their future was rebellion against the regime.3 Finally, there was a 
relatively cohesive Shia community, providing the foundation for revolutionary 
organization.4 All the models suggested strong revolutionary potential among the Shia 
population of Iraq.  
THE 1991 UPRISING  
The Shia resistance assumed its most intense form following the end of the Gulf War 
(DESERT STORM). One journalist with good Islamic resistance sources noted that the 
Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq's (SCIRI - the Tehran-based insurgent 
leadership group) strategic plan for a successful Shia uprising was a "running series of 
political demonstrations at a time of crisis," followed by unification of the populace 
against the regime and winning over the army to the opposition; only then was there to be 
an armed revolt. The rapid pace of events during and immediately after the Gulf War 
negated this strategy, however. Almost all Iraqi forces, with the exception of most 
Republican Guard units, in the Kuwaiti Theater of Operations collapsed in the face of 
Coalition air and ground attacks. Virtually any semblance of unit cohesion among the 
Iraqi forces disintegrated. By the end of February 1991, Southern Iraqis could view an 
Iraqi military that was in shambles and a seemingly overwhelming Coalition military 
presence "just over the horizon." A seeming power vacuum had developed in the south 
and, in March, a number of Shia areas exploded into active insurrection.  
The March 1991 uprising caught the Shia leadership unprepared, as displayed by the 
chaotic course of the newly energized insurgency.5 Major unrest started first in Basrah on 
2 March.6 Most of the fighting around Basra reportedly was led by retreating soldiers, 
and almost all the soldiers in the area took part.7 Deserters also apparently played a 
significant role. The fighting spread very quickly from town to town in a very 
uncoordinated manner. By the 5th, over twelve towns in southern Iraq reportedly were in 
the hands of the rebels. The situation had reached sufficient seriousness by 7 March that 
the regime publicly acknowledged the unrest. Further signaling the government's 
concern, Saddam Hussein named his cousin as the new chief of internal security, and the 
government expelled almost all foreign journalists from the country.8 Baghdad responded 
forcefully to the turmoil, sending its remaining Republican Guard units to both the north 
and south of the country, together with a reported increased public security presence in 
Baghdad.  
Despite some bitter fighting, the government was able to put down the southern rebellion 
relatively quickly. On 16 March, Saddam Hussein, apparently believing the situation 
controllable, addressed the Iraqi public and indirectly confirmed the size of the earlier 
unrest by blaming it on "herds of rancorous traitors" assisted by "mobs who have strayed 
from the right path."9 The government media reflected Baghdad's confidence in the 
regime's stability by "interviewing" both witnesses and participants in the uprising who 
described "killing, looting, stealing, and setting buildings, cars, and government buildings 
on fire."10 By 28 March, the government had retaken all the towns held by the insurgents 
in the south. By the 30th, it apparently felt the situation was sufficiently calm that it 
reportedly began moving Republican Guard units to the north to respond to the Kurdish 
fighting.11  
The fighting was marked by extreme brutality on both sides. Although most attention in 
the West was directed toward the atrocities committed by the government forces, the 
rebels also committed their share of atrocities. They killed virtually any Ba'ath Party 
official they could find, and also massacred the families and relatives of government 
officials.12 The rebels' actions reached such an extreme that a senior Iraqi cleric 
associated with the opposition issued a fatwa (religious decree) calling for more humane 
treatment of prisoners and the end of unnecessary killings.13 Government forces were 
equally (if not more) brutal than the rebels. There were numerous reports of mass 
hangings of suspected rebels and atrocities against both insurgents and civilians.14 
Generally, no quarter was given by either side. 
Given the chaos in the area, estimates of the number of insurgents and overall casualties 
vary widely. One source claims that around the city of Karbala alone, there were 50,000 
insurgents.15 An opposition official claimed up to 125,000 fighters against the regime.16 
The SCIRI reportedly moved "several thousand" soldiers from Iran into Iraq to support 
the uprising after it began.17 Their presence seemed to have little impact on the results of 
the fighting, however. Despite the lack of hard numbers for insurgent strength, it is clear 
that the unrest was very widespread. The number of casualties from the fighting is 
equally uncertain. One Arab doctor who toured the area shortly after the unrest subsided 
estimated that 50,000 to 60,000 had been killed.18 One reflection of the turmoil was the 
high number of refugees created by the fighting. At the beginning of April, the UN High 
Commissioner for Refugees made an official count of 50,000 Iraqi refugees in Iran, 
mostly from southern Iraq.19 The number of internally displaced Iraqis was almost 
certainly much higher.20
One key issue marked the rebellion. Despite earlier (and later) moves toward unifying the 
Iraqi opposition, the Shia leadership and insurgents during the uprising raised exclusively 
Shia goals. The most common slogan heard during the rebellion was "Jafari (Shia) Rule." 
Moreover, when the SCIRI finally did begin to try to exert leadership over the course of 
the insurgency (well after its beginning), the military command issued orders that "all 
Iraqi armed forces should submit to and obey [SCIRI] orders . . . no ideas except the 
rightful Islamic ones should be disseminated . . . "21 Combined with widespread 
executions of both minor Ba'ath officials and suspected collaborators, the Shia calls for a 
Shia government isolated them from potential collaboration with non-Shias. More 
importantly, the lack of effective planning and leadership precluded the spread of 
insurgent activity to Baghdad. Although some small-scale unrest among the Shia areas of 
Baghdad was reported, it was easily contained by the regime. 
The 1991 revolt should not be viewed in isolation. It was the culmination of a history of 
Shia unrest in Iraq. The following sections are intended to provide the background for 
assessing the reasons for and possible future of Shia opposition in Iraq. This article will 
use Bard O'Neill's six variables for examining insurgent strategies and outcomes: human 
and physical environment, popular support, organization, unity, external support and 
government response.22 Four of the factors generally favored the insurgent movement. 
Unity remained somewhat problematic for the insurgents. The final variable of 
government response, however, appears to be the key reason for the crushing of the 
insurgency. The Iraqi government's willingness and capability to use brutal and calibrated 
repression has thus far contained the Shia opposition movement.  
ENVIRONMENT  
Shia unrest in Iraq may be viewed as a reaction to an aggrieved majority reacting to 
minority rule. Shia Arabs represent somewhere over 54 percent of the population of 
Iraq.23 Although the Shia are viewed - and, more importantly, view themselves - as a 
distinct and separate group, the widespread existence of Shia in Iraq is actually a 
relatively recent phenomenon.  
The majority of conversions to Shi'ism occurred in the nineteenth century. Several factors 
were involved in the conversions from Sunnism to Shi'ism. During the eighteenth 
century, Persian ulama (religious scholars) and religious students arrived in the southern 
Iraqi shrine cities in large numbers, largely due to difficulties between the religious 
establishment and the regime in Persia. Although some of this migration was later 
reversed, even by 1919, there were an estimated 80,000 Persians in Iraq.24 Throughout 
this period, the Iranians in Iraq were granted considerable extraterritorial privileges.  
Largely owing to their strong economic support from followers in Iran, the Iranian 
religious figures in Iraq had a major impact on revitalizing southern Iraq. This was 
particularly true of the two principal shrine cities of Karbala and Najaf. Both cities 
became major centers not only of religious significance but also economic centers for the 
surrounding region. Karbala in particular acquired a strong Persian character and a 
majority Iranian population; Najaf, on the other hand, continued to be controlled by Iraqi 
tribal leaders.25 The rise of these two Shia-controlled cities had a major impact on the 
tribes living in southern Iraq, with these tribal groups forming the majority of the 
population of the area. During the late eighteenth through mid-nineteenth century, most 
of the tribes converted to Shi'ism, leading to significant disruptions in tribal patterns and 
to the growth of southern Iraq as the major area of Shia population. 
The actual internalization of Shia beliefs, however, remained subject to considerable 
doubt: "the conversion to Shi'ism did not pervade the former social and moral values of 
the tribesmen."26 Many of the previously existing tribal social systems and religious 
practices continued to have significant impact. At the same time, a number of Shia 
religious observances that were a vital part of the Iranian Shia culture were either 
modified or largely ignored in Iraq. Nevertheless, events involving the religious 
establishment in Iran continued to have impact on Iraqi Shias. The Iranian Constitutional 
Revolution was reflected by increased political activism by ulama in Iraq. The Iraqi 
ulama were particularly active in the early 1900s in calling for jihad against foreign 
encroachments in Islamic countries.27 Such activism culminated in the 1920 revolt 
against the British in Iraq, which saw significant clerical activism and incitement, among 
both Shia and Sunni ulama.28
After the formation of the modern Iraqi state, the Iraqi Shia ulama saw a steady erosion 
of power. This was due partially to a series of disputes over who would be the supreme 
leader of the ulama within Iraq. The ulama also continued political agitation that proved 
largely fruitless. Their series of political misadventures not only alienated them from the 
government, but also displayed their ultimate political impotence. Also, in the face of 
religious opposition, the Iraqi government expelled a number of Iranian ulama in the 
1920s, leading to further weakness and splits within the religious establishment. This led 
to the increased importance of Shia tribal leaders vis-ˆ-vis the religious establishment, 
and to the decreasing significance of the shrine cities in Iraqi politics.  
Economic issues also played a role in the relative weakness of the ulama. In comparison 
with Iran, the religious endowments and religiously-owned property in Iraq remained 
limited in scope and value. In the 1920s and 1930s, Shia religious endowments 
increasingly came under the control of the government, rather than being controlled 
independently.29 Perhaps even more critically, there was no significant Shia merchant 
class to support the ulama. This was partially due to the overall nature of the Iraqi 
economy in the nineteenth century, which was largely "transit trade" with few economic 
benefits to Iraq proper.30 The merchant class in general was not terribly prosperous in 
historical Iraq. More directly, the major merchants in Iraq historically were not Shia. 
Using figures for the Baghdad Chamber of Commerce, which included the most 
significant businessmen in Iraq, for 1938-39, the most significant single group of 
merchants was Jewish, with Shia businesses a very distant second.31  
The role of the Jewish merchant class obviously was sharply curtailed in the late 1940s 
with the establishment of Israel, but their economic stratum was filled predominantly by 
Sunni Iraqis rather than Shia.32 Clearly, there were some significant Shia merchants. The 
point, however, is that the Iraqi merchant class never developed an independent identity 
and power structure vis-â-vis the government comparable to the Iranian case. The 
religious establishment could not count upon an established merchant class for economic 
and political support. There is little evidence that the Shia merchants found any particular 
convergence of interests with the ulama or that they provided a high level of support for 
the ulama. As a result, many senior Iraqi mujtahids (religious leaders) had to rely on 
foreign, particularly Iranian, economic support, which clearly was subject to considerable 
fluctuation.33  
The decreasing importance of the ulama was reflected in their drop in numbers. In 1918, 
there were 6,000 theological students in Najaf, the main holy city. By 1957, the number 
had dropped to 1,954, of whom only 326 were Iraqis.34 Moreover, the ulama gained a 
reputation for being out of touch with the modernizing trends of Iraqi society. This was 
particularly noticeable in the field of education. As Iraq began a major drive to extend 
secular education in the 1920s and 1930s, the ulama actively fought against the formation 
of secular schools and discouraged parents from sending their children to these schools.35 
Such efforts were largely in vain, however, and the Shia religious schools continued to 
decline.  
Despite the relative lack of power of the Shia ulama during the pre-Ba'ath period in Iraq 
prior to 1968, the Shia developed as a relatively cohesive community. This process was 
facilitated by the tribal background of most Shia, providing both kinship ties and at least 
the remnants of societal organization. These communal ties were further solidified as a 
result of shared Shia grievances.  
The Shia communities in the south generally were not afforded the same economic 
support as were the Sunni areas in the center of the country. Shia generally comprised the 
lower economic stratum of Iraq, and there was a widespread belief among them that their 
economic advancement was blocked as a deliberate strategy by the Sunni ruling class.36 
The Shia also were not afforded the same political opportunities as the Sunni. Although 
there were a number of Shia in the government during the monarchy, the perception 
(largely accurate) was that the Sunni retained the most significant political positions for 
themselves, along with dominating the officer corps.37 To some degree, the paucity of 
Shia in the government could be ascribed to early rulings by the ulama that the faithful 
should not participate in a government that might be illegitimate.38 The subsequent Ba'ath 
government only intensified the lack of Shia political participation. Although the short-
lived Ba'ath government of 1963 had significant Shia participation, with four Arab Shia 
in senior positions out of eight, this was not the case in the established Ba'ath government 
of 1968 in which none of the 15 members of the Revolutionary Command Council was 
Shia.39 This decreased representation was also reflected at lower levels of leadership in 
which up to 1963, of the 53 top Ba'ath leaders, 53.8 percent were Shia. The comparable 
figure for the post-1963 Shia leaders was 5.7 percent.40 This precipitous drop in Shia 
membership after 1963 likely was the result of lessons learned by the Ba'athist senior 
leaders in their short-lived 1963 government (to be discussed below); party leaders 
evidently determined that a smaller, more cohesive leadership structure of closely trusted 
allies likely would be more able to seize and hold power. This likely was a rational 
strategy for a conspiratorial group in the environment of Iraq at that time. As with other 
Iraqi parties and groups vying for power, the Ba'athists found the Shia to be expendable 
in terms of political support. Given the number of grievances by the Shia, and the lack of 
response of the various governments to their complaints, the Shia formed a population 
that was conducive to insurgency. 
One other environmental factor affecting the course of insurgency must be noted. This 
was the role of demographics. The Shia population of Iraq was concentrated in the south, 
and increasingly in Baghdad. Central Iraq was almost exclusively Sunni, while the north 
was largely Kurdish. The vast majority of Kurds were (and are) Sunni, with a small 
minority Shia, but religious bases have played no role in their political struggles. This 
segmentation of Iraq into what might be viewed as religious sectors had several possible 
impacts on the potential for and conduct of insurgencies. From potential insurgent 
leaders' perspectives, it provided a concentration of population with shared interests and 
potential grievances, enhancing the possibility of mobilizing the people in support of 
insurgencies. At the same time, however, it provided the government some advantages in 
controlling insurgencies through the same concentration of population. Unless the 
potential insurgents could unify both confessional and ethnic groups, the government 
could focus all its forces and energies on one area. 
The role of Baghdad deserves special mention. It grew very rapidly in this century, from 
a population of about 150,000 in 1908 to about 1.5 million in 1965; it potentially reached 
over 2.5 million in 1977.41 Although on a smaller scale, the city of Basrah in the south 
also underwent such exponential growth. The majority of this population increase was the 
result of migration of peasants and tribesmen from rural areas to the city. Such migration 
was particularly pronounced among the Shia. The percentage of Shia among Baghdad's 
population before World War I was about 20 percent, but by 1958, it had grown to over 
50 percent.42 The majority of the Shia lived in an area called Al Thawrah (later renamed 
Saddam City); this area was marked by a high density of poor families and very primitive 
living conditions. Both the poor living conditions and the social dislocation provided a 
population ripe for mobilization by groups offering the potential for social improvements.  
ORGANIZATION AND UNITY 
Shia political unrest and insurgent activities can be usefully divided into three periods. 
The first happened under the British mandate and monarchical rule from World War I 
through 1958. The second occurred in the period of military rule, including the short-
lived Ba'ath regime of 1963, until 1968, and the third during the consolidation of the 
Ba'ath regime in 1968. Each period was marked by different dynamics and differing 
forms of Shia political organization and activities.  
During World War I and the subsequent British mandate, the Shia ulama were very active 
in urging pro-nationalistic and anti-British actions. When the British invaded Iraq (then 
called Mesopotamia) during World War I, the ulama declared a holy war and actively 
solicited tribesmen to join forces in an effort to repel the British. Despite some initially 
heavy fighting, the British eventually succeeded in occupying all of Iraq and took control 
of it after the war. The ulama remained very active in opposing the British. In 1919, the 
principal Shia mujtahid, Muhammad Taqi Shirazi, issued a religious decree (fatwa) 
stating that "none but Muslims have any right to rule over Muslims"; this was followed 
by other ulama calling for an independent Arab government ruled by a descendant of the 
Prophet.43 There were also joint Shia-Sunni political activities. The increasing unrest led 
to a tribal revolt in 1920. This revolt was largely confined to the Shia tribesmen, with 
very few Sunni tribes participating. The revolt did have the effect, however, of 
convincing the British to appoint Faisal, the son of Sharif Hussein of Mecca, as king of 
Iraq.  
Although this move ostensibly satisfied one of the demands of the ulama, in that Iraq was 
now "ruled" by a Muslim, the clear lack of Faisal's independence quickly became 
evident. The ulama continued their agitation for an independent Iraq with increased Shia 
participation in government.44 They also issued religious decrees against a mandatory 
relationship with Britain. In response to their agitation, the British expelled a number of 
the senior ulama, who had to sign agreements to abstain from politics in order to return to 
Iraq. Although there were scattered outbreaks of Shia tribal violence in the 1930s, the 
ulama generally were relatively quiescent in the 1930s through early 1950s. This 
tendency was even further strengthened by the supreme mujtahid, Muhammad Burujirdi 
(who lived in Qom, Iran), who in 1950 prohibited political activity by all Shia ulama and 
threatened the equivalent of excommunication for those who engaged in politics.45  
One very significant issue that emerged during this period, involving both the overall 
Shia population and the ulama, was the rise of the Iraqi Communist Party (ICP). Given 
the low socioeconomic status of many Shia, the ICP was attractive to many Shia, 
particularly considering the relative lack of mobilization efforts by the ulama. Although 
the ICP was not overwhelmingly Shia, the Shia were well-represented in the party, most 
especially at the lower echelons. ICP cadres spent considerable time and effort in 
ideological proselytizing among the Shia migrants to Baghdad. 
Beginning particularly in the mid-1940s, the ulama began speaking out against 
communism and requesting help in fighting its spread. Clearly, they generally found the 
rise of the communist party to be more threatening to their interests than the actions of 
the British-influenced government. They seemed to be willing to cooperate with a 
government that they viewed at best as being of questionable legitimacy in order to 
oppose a more dangerous enemy. Beyond the theological and philosophical differences 
with communism, the Shia religious establishment almost certainly viewed the ICP as 
directly attacking their influence and power, given the large number of Shia in the party.  
The overthrow of the monarchy and the 1958 assumption of power of Abdal Karim 
Qasim, an army officer, tied together the Shia anti-communist movement and anti-
government trends. Qasim used the ICP as one of the mobilizing tools of his regime, and 
communist influence on the government increased significantly. Rhetorical attacks on the 
communists were now joined with similar attacks on the government for permitting the 
communists to gain influence. The Qasim regime, in the meantime, was in fact 
addressing some of the needs of Shia, including low-income housing and a new water 
system in Karbala, new roads in the south and promotion of Shia in the government and 
army.46 Nevertheless, the ulama continued their pressure on the government to reduce the 
power of the ICP with a virtual flurry of religious decrees, including labeling adherence 
to communism as being "one of the greatest sins;" declaring that the religious 
observances of communist Muslims were not acceptable to God; prohibiting buying meat 
from communist butchers; and prohibiting inheritance by a communist from a Muslim 
father.47 The ulama pressure began to have an influence on Qasim, who withdrew much 
of his support from the ICP. Subsequently, "several thousand" communist party members 
and supporters, mostly in Sunni areas, were murdered or forced to flee.48
In 1963, the Qasim regime was overthrown by a coup led by army officers and the Ba'ath 
Party. In response to the coup, a large number of ICP members and supporters took to the 
streets. The new government launched an offensive against suspected communists, with 
about 10,000 arrested and many executed.49 Shia clergy were active in the anti-
communist efforts and assisted the new government in quashing "communist" 
resistance.50 The new government was short-lived, being overthrown in November 1963 
by Arab nationalist army officers. From 1963 to 1968, Iraq was ruled by Abdul Salam 
Arif and, after his death in a helicopter crash, his brother Abdul Rahman Arif. This 
regime undertook widespread nationalization of private companies, a move that created 
considerable opposition among the Shia ulama, both because of their interpretation of 
Islamic precepts and because a number of the businesses nationalized were owned by 
Shia who had provided religious endowments to the Shia religious establishment. With 
the nationalizations, the ulama lost yet another source of funding.  
In July 1968, the Ba'athists seized power once again, with Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr as 
president. Within a short period of time, Saddam Hussein became the clear power within 
the regime, but he did not assume the office of president until 1979. From virtually the 
start of the Ba'athist regime, it was actively at odds with the Shia religious establishment. 
While governmental actions will be discussed more fully below, it is important to stress 
that the government moved aggressively and heavy handedly against any possible Shia 
unrest. As a result, it initially may have provoked more resistance than it precluded. 
Beyond the government actions directly against the Shia, the Ba'ath regime provided a 
more general threat to the ulama and religious Shia by a policy strongly emphasizing 
secularization of the country. A Ba'ath official described the regime's policy as: "In this 
country your own personal religion is up to you, but the religion of the Ba'ath party is 
obligatory."51 Hussein also stressed the need to restrict the role of religion: "We have to 
oppose the institutionalization of religion in the state and the society and to oppose the 
movement of the revolution into religion. We should return to the roots of our religion 
but not introduce it into politics."52 In speeches and interviews, Saddam Hussein 
generally avoided any mention of religion, and continued to stress pan-Arabism and 
socialism.53  
The level of secularization attempted by the Ba'athists clearly was viewed as a threat by 
the Shia religious establishment, and several Shia opposition movements developed.54 
Even before the Ba'athist regime assumed power, several Shia groups began 
organizational efforts. Such groups included al-Dawah, the Islamic Task Organization, 
founded in 1961, and the Followers, established in 1962. A number of other groups were 
formed, but most were short-lived and of limited significance, and later merged with the 
predominant groups. The Ba'ath regime's activities reenergized Shia opposition, and the 
Shia groups reportedly gained a significant number of recruits.  
By the late 1970s and 1980s, there were two major Shia insurgent groups in Iraq: al-
Dawah al Islamiah (the Islamic Call) and the Mujahidin (Holy Warriors). Al-Dawah was 
formed in the late 1950s or early 1960s; the exact date is subject to some debate since the 
organization emerged from a series of discussion groups whose initial aims principally 
were to revive Islam within Iraq. Clerics became convinced that religion was suffering 
serious erosion as secularism gained strength. Al-Dawah's early history was marked 
principally by an emphasis on theological issues, but it became increasingly politically 
active around the time of the Iranian Revolution. It was a larger and better funded 
organization, but the Mujahidin conducted more armed operations during this period. To 
a large extent, al-Dawah focused on political and ideological issues, while the Mujahidin 
served as the military arm of the struggle.  
The core of al-Dawah was a group of clerics, both of Iraqi and Iranian origin.55 The 
Mujahidin leaders, on the other hand, have come more from graduates of modern schools 
and colleges.56 Both groups, however, have stated that their philosophy is drawn from the 
writings and preachings of Muhammed Baqir al-Sadr. Al-Sadr stressed the need to return 
to Islam for both individual and societal progress. He also emphasized that Islam was 
compatible with modern societies, and in fact was necessary to build a just society that 
would avoid exploitation. In 1979, al-Sadr gave his vision of an Islamic government. This 
included belief that sovereignty belongs to God; the basis of legislation is Islam, but that 
the legislature can pass any law that is compatible with Islam; the people are entrusted 
with power; and the ulama should serve as the interpreters of law.57 The state is 
responsible for providing knowledge of Islam, enacting and enforcing Islamic law and 
maintaining social justice.58
In comparison to many of the Iraqi Shia ulama, al-Sadr was very progressive and reached 
out to the more secularized educated Shia.59 His writings tended to minimize purely Shia 
references, apparently in an attempt to minimize Shia- Sunni differences while stressing 
the overarching nature of Islam.60 In fact, shortly before his execution in 1980, al-Sadr 
reportedly said, "We must all defend the Islamic flag whatever its sectarian colour."61 As 
Chibli Mallat notes, however, al-Sadr had significant difficulties in bridging the 
philosophical gap between Sunnism and Shi'ism.62
The growth of Shia unrest appears to be tied closely with deteriorating economic 
conditions of the Shia populace.63 Also, the core areas of support for the insurgent 
movements tended to be urban areas with a significant population of recent migrants 
from the countryside. Although as noted, the Iranian Revolution gave a major boost to 
Iraqi Shia activism, the Ba'ath regime faced Shia unrest even before Khomeini's success. 
Particularly notable were the disturbances of 1977, in which "tens of thousands" of Shia 
participated.64 In February of that year, large crowds of Shia, some apparently armed, 
congregated in Najaf and Karbala, with calls for the regime's overthrow. The army had to 
be used to put down the unrest. The exact causes of the disturbances are murky, but they 
represented a significant challenge to the regime.65
Beginning in 1979, all Islamic groups came under the putative umbrella of the Islamic 
Liberation Movement, which issued a manifesto calling for "all means" to resist the 
regime.66 The regime's response was even further repression, including execution of 
ulama and their family members and imprisonment of a large number of potential 
followers. The Shia resistance movement was largely decapitated, with the surviving 
leaders fleeing into exile, particularly Iran. This almost certainly disrupted mobilizational 
and organizational efforts of Shia anti-regime activities. 
Nevertheless, there were a number of attacks on government officials and installations. 
The extent, severity and impact of these attacks remains subject to some doubt. The 
regime generally was able to prevent media attention to insurgent activities, while the 
insurgents obviously exaggerated their exploits. There also seemed to be little coherent 
overall strategy in target selection; most attacks seemed to be independently selected and 
conducted by individual insurgent cells with little overarching plan. Despite leadership 
problems, there were a series of insurgent activities creating a number of government 
casualties.67 There is little evidence that the scope of such attacks intensified significantly 
after the start of the Iran-Iraq War. Again, however, this might be a result of increased 
foreign media controls in Iraq after the war began rather than the actual situation. 
In 1982, al-Dawah, the Mujahidin and smaller Shia groups met in Tehran and founded 
the Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq.68 This group was intended to 
coordinate anti-regime activities and to provide a basis for common strategies. Overall, 
however, its record has been less than impressive. Although not formally renouncing its 
membership, al-Dawah has stopped cooperating with SCIRI. Within Iraq itself, SCIRI 
commonly has been viewed as essentially a tool of Iran, especially since all its leadership 
is based in Iran.  
Apparently recognizing the weakness of the Shia opposition as an independent 
movement, Shia leaders agreed to cooperate with other opposition movements in an 
attempt to oust the Ba'athists. By one count, in 1991 there were some 70 opposition 
groups in exile.69 Each of these groupings has a very specific agenda, with the only 
unifying force being opposition to Saddam. In the past, they have been bitterly divided 
over their grand visions of Iraq in the future. During and after the war, these groups were 
cajoled, primarily by the US and Britain, to form an umbrella united opposition 
movement to Saddam. Several conferences and meetings were held, but little came from 
these meetings. On several occasions in fact, the groups could not even make it through 
the meetings without public ruptures developing.  
Ostensibly, an umbrella organization called the Iraqi National Congress finally was 
agreed to in an effort to coordinate the opposition. Current INC documents call for the 
overthrow of the present regime, while establishing "a democratic, constitutional, 
parliamentary and pluralistic" government that maintains "territorial integrity."70 Clearly, 
these somewhat boilerplate goals represent a series of compromises that do not reflect 
traditional objectives such as Kurdish independence or Shia Islamic government. The 
leadership council likewise represents the secular trend within the opposition.71 The 
major achievement to date of the INC was the election of a 234 member National 
Assembly in October 1992. However, despite some meetings and calls for a united 
struggle, there is no evidence that this group has had any practical effect whatsoever. In 
many ways, the rhetoric and activities of its members, most of whose leaders live in 
London, are somewhat analogous to the White Russian emigres of the 1920s.  
POPULAR SUPPORT  
There clearly has been a significant group of Shia with grievances that could provide a 
population base for an insurgency. The 1977 unrest suggests that at least for a time, 
mobilization of a significant segment of the population was entirely possible. 
Nevertheless, such widespread mobilization in fact did not occur during the Iran-Iraq 
War. Despite extensive Iranian propaganda directed to the Shia, no mass uprising took 
place. Moreover, the army, in which Shia comprised the majority of enlisted soldiers,72 
did not collapse, and in fact fought relatively well once the campaigning shifted to 
defending Iraqi territory against Iranian counterattacks.73  
Particularly in the early fighting in Iran, the Iraqis suffered a large number of prisoners 
and some desertions. Some prisoners and deserters defected to the Iranian side to fight 
against the Iraqi government. As with most issues involving Iraq, the actual number of 
Iraqis who fought on the Iranian side is very uncertain, but was unlikely to have been 
more than a few thousand.74 The numbers certainly did not suggest an army under 
collapse. Moreover, the Iranians generally organized most of the defectors into regular 
military units, whose fighting ability was not notable. The Iraqis were organized into the 
so-called Badr Corps, consisting of an infantry division, artillery division and an armored 
division, all understrength. Only some of the Iraqis were organized into a guerrilla 
organization, where they might have had the most impact. This also gave the Iraqi regime 
a valuable propaganda tool: opponents of the regime, whether Shia, Sunni, or Kurdish, 
were not opposing the regime in power, but instead were "traitors" to the Iraqi nation.75  
The overall relative cohesion of the Iraqi army and the willingness of its predominant 
Shia base to fight for the regime took a number of analysts at the time by some surprise. 
The Iraqi government, however, proved itself quite adept at using nationalist and patriotic 
themes in motivating Shia to view themselves first as Iraqis. This particularly was the 
case after the fighting moved into Iraq itself. Abbas Kelidar provides a good description 
of Shia perceptions of their situation: "The Shiis of Iraq, whose history and background 
are different from their coreligionists in Iran, object to having their ethnic identity and 
national affiliation continuously questioned by the Sunni political establishment as well 
as the ideologues of Arab nationalism."76  
In general, there were three main groups supporting the Shia insurgency during the Iran-
Iraq War: the clergy, students and intellectuals and the urban poor. To a large degree, the 
clergy formed the intellectual and political basis of the movement, while the students and 
intellectuals tended to be the military arm. The urban poor obviously constitute by far the 
largest potential population base for an insurgency, but "[a]s actual members of Islamic 
groups, the urban poor have probably never outnumbered the young intelligentsia."77 
With the exception of a handful of demonstrations, the urban poor have not played a 
major role in Islamic unrest. Other social groups, such as peasants and merchants, also 
were largely absent from Islamic unrest.  
The post-DESERT STORM uprising clearly was considerably broader than the insurgent 
activity during the Iran-Iraq War. The earlier operations had been characterized by 
activities carried out by small cells of the resistance, or in some cases, apparently 
individual actions. Most typically, these cells launched attempted assassinations or quick 
raids. Little attention seemed to be paid to mobilizing groups of supporters or to holding 
areas, even temporarily, for the propaganda value. The 1991 operations, on the other 
hand, involved considerable mobilization, with a significant portion being what might be 
termed self-mobilization and attempts to hold territory.  
The scope of the popular resistance following DESERT STORM took all observers 
(apparently including the Iraqi Shia opposition leaders in Iran) by surprise. Several 
factors may account for the relatively narrow Shia insurgent activities in the earlier war 
as compared to 1991. The shock of the virtual disintegration of the Iraqi army in an 
extremely short period in 1991 may have led to a perceived vacuum of regime ability to 
repress the opposition. At the very least, the utter disorganization of the Iraqi army meant 
that it would take the regime time to respond to a rebellion, giving the insurgents some 
time in which to organize and mobilize. Allied forces were very close to much of the area 
of the uprising, perhaps leading the insurgents to believe that US or other foreign forces 
would intervene on their behalf. The presence of large numbers of Iraqi soldiers and 
deserters in the area provided a cadre of militarily trained fighters.  
The differing nature of external propaganda may have played at least a contributing role. 
US propaganda during the Gulf War stressed relatively narrow goals, primarily calling 
for the Iraqi people to remove Saddam Hussein, but stressing the need to retain Iraq's 
sovereignty and existence as a unitary state. Iranian propaganda on the other hand was 
much harsher and broader, calling for the destruction of the regime.78 The vituperousness 
of the Iranian propaganda was such that it may actually have played into the hands of the 
Iraqi regime, allowing Baghdad to claim that Iran was determined to destroy the entire 
nation of Iraq. Anecdotal reports from the period of the Iran-Iraq War strongly indicate 
that a large number of Iraqis, including Shia, were convinced that they had to support the 
regime in order to preserve the Iraqi nation. Finally, southern Iraq was a principal 
battlefield in both wars, and had seen considerable destruction. Although unmeasurable 
given the paucity of independent pollsters in Iraq, the Shia and other Iraqis in the south 
may finally have grown sufficiently weary of Saddam's military misadventures that 
almost anything, including armed revolt, seemed preferable to his continued rule. 
GOVERNMENT RESPONSE 
The Iraqi regime publicly was highly intent on implementing modernization and 
secularization of the country as an integral part of the Ba'athist ideology. It clearly 
identified Shia groups as a potential obstacle to these goals, and reacted forcefully to the 
possible threat posed by the Shia. Virtually from the start of the regime, it began severe 
repression against the Shia. Two principal means of repression were used: arrests and 
executions, and expulsion of "Iranians." It also closed the Shia Kufa University in Najaf, 
together with seizing all the school's funds. In 1969, the regime banned religious 
processions, confiscated religious endowments, imposed censorship on religious 
publications, allowed sale of liquor in Shia holy cities, abolished religious schools and 
teaching of Islam in government schools, and stopped the recitation of the Quran on radio 
and television.79 In 1970, the Iraqi government began to stress Iraq's pre-Islamic past, 
including re-naming the country's districts to pre-Islamic names. These moves may be 
compared to similar efforts by the Shah in Iran. In March 1978, Baghdad took over 
control of all Shia revenues.80  
The Iraqi regime displayed little reluctance to arrest and, in many cases execute, Shia 
opposition leaders and members. In marked contrast to the Shah's hesitancy, the Ba'ath 
government also targeted religious figures at all levels. Beyond arresting clerics, the 
regime also imprisoned their entire families. In March 1980, the government issued a 
decree making it a capital offense to be a member of al-Dawah.81 From 1974 to 1985, at 
least 50 clerics were executed by the government, with several others in exile being 
assassinated.82 The most prominent and significant execution was that of Baqir al-Sadr in 
1980. The total number of executions and those Shia killed in disturbances against the 
government is very inexact, with estimates between 1,000 and 30,000.83  
Expulsions of Iraqis of Iranian origin became a common governmental tactic. As 
previously noted, in the nineteenth century there was considerable Iranian presence in 
Iraq. Intermarriage and permanent settlement became common. Iraqi citizenship 
documents continued to list about two million Iraqis as being "of Iranian origin;" such 
persons could have come from families having lived in Iraq for generations.84 As of 1968, 
there were an estimated 22,860 persons with Iranian passports living in Iraq.85 In 1968-
69, 20,000 "Iranians" were expelled; in 1971, 40,000 Fayliya Kurds (the only Shia 
Kurds) and 60,000 other Iraqi Shia were expelled; in 1980, 30,000; and 20,000 in 1981-
82.86 Internal expulsions also were used; in 1976, about 200,000 Kurds were exiled to the 
Shia south.87 It is of course difficult to determine whether Saddam's major fear was of the 
expellees' Iranian origin or of their Shi'ism. In practical terms, the motivations were likely 
a combination of the two.  
At the same time, however, the regime began pumping considerable money into religious 
accounts for refurbishing shrines and mosques, and increased funding for pilgrims. The 
government also expanded funding for such projects as electrification and health care for 
Shia areas. Political concessions also were made to the Shia. In June 1982, a party 
congress elected a new regional command for the Ba'ath Party. The new members were 
mostly Shia, and gave Shia at least a plurality on the regional command. It must be noted, 
however, that these new members were not seated on the Regional Command Council, 
the actual decision-making organ of the Iraqi regime.88 Likewise, in the 1980 and 1984 
elections, the regime guaranteed that at least 40 percent of those elected to the National 
Assembly would be Shia and that the Speaker would be a Shia.89 Unsurprisingly, the 
National Assembly has virtually no real power. 
Saddam also began to stress his personal religiosity. He laced public statements with 
religious references and praise of historical Shia religious examples. He began appearing 
in Shia areas in traditional robes while offering gifts such as television sets to the 
residents. Saddam's trump card was his public production in 1979 of a genealogical table 
"proving" that he was a direct descendant of Ali and Mohammed.90 While it is certainly 
far from apparent that such moves convinced anyone of Saddam's sincerity, they at least 
suggested some moderation in the regime's overt hostility to Shi'ism in general.  
The government's response to the 1991 uprising followed a similar pattern of sharp 
repression, and some political and economic concessions. The brutality with which loyal 
military units put down the rebellion was noteworthy even for Iraq. The presence of 
soldiers and deserters among the insurgents likely stiffened the resistance to the regime, 
since these soldiers were unlikely to trust the tender mercies of the government. Likely 
recognizing this, Saddam issued a blanket amnesty of deserters in late March. Whether 
this had much effect on the military insurgents and whether in fact all deserters escaped 
execution is unknown, but it provided at least one tool for the regime to split some of the 
insurgents away from the movement. One difficulty facing the army in putting down the 
unrest was the terrain, which in southern Iraq is very marshy and suitable for insurgent 
activity. At the same time, however, the geographic narrowness enabled the military to 
seal off the operational area and methodically hunt down the insurgents.91 The 
combination of extensive ground forces and the use of helicopters - which in retrospect 
were mistakenly not prohibited by the allied coalition - allowed the regime to quash the 
insurgency in about a month. After relative calm returned to the area, the regime provided 
an increased level of economic support to the Shia region. One aspect of this aid was 
rebuilding cities damaged or destroyed in the fighting. Reports from the area indicated 
that at least in the cases of Karbala and Najaf, much of the inner city reconstruction 
opened up the area and provided wider streets and less congestion. Not coincidentally, 
this would also make it easier for movement of the tanks and armored personnel carriers 
of the security forces. 
EXTERNAL SUPPORT  
As already indicated, Iran has been the major supporter of Shia opposition movements in 
Iraq. Since most aspects of this support have already been discussed, only a few points 
will be noted here. Since the Shia opposition leadership is based largely in Iran, Tehran 
clearly has significant influence over the Iraqi Shia leaders. Members and followers of 
the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq receive logistical, financial, 
training and propaganda support from Iran, and it is very unlikely that they can follow a 
course not approved by the Iranian regime. The SCIRI itself has remained largely aloof 
from the non-Shia opposition groups, especially since many of the other groups are 
backed by Western governments opposed by Iran.92 The extent to which the Iranian 
government will agree to cooperate with non-Shia opposition groups is very questionable. 
Since some Shia are involved with the Western-supported groups, there is the clear 
prospect for a split among the Shia opposition leaders.  
In addition to its other support for the SCIRI, Iran has provided military equipment and 
training. There have been no indications, however, that Iranian forces have participated 
directly in SCIRI-led operations within Iraq.93 Cross-border operations by Iranian forces 
have focused on brief raids on some Kurdish groups and Iranian exile groups along the 
border. These have all been conventional military operations directed against what 
Tehran views as specific internal security threats. The Iranian government has shown no 
indication of wanting to participate in more extensive support of Iraqi Shia opposition.  
Some clues as to future Iranian support tactics for Iraqi Shia may be offered by news 
accounts and editorials from Iran. Since DESERT STORM, there has been some slight 
difference of tone in Iranian propaganda, with the broadcasts more specifically directed 
against the Iraqi regime itself and somewhat less focusing specifically on the necessity 
for Shia revolts. This would fit in with Tehran's attempts to improve relations with other 
Gulf countries, most of whom are concerned about their own Shia. Tehran also has 
stressed the need to maintain the territorial integrity of Iraq (another key goal of other 
Gulf states) with both the regime and the SCIRI head, Baqer al-Hakim, emphasizing the 
need for a unitary Iraq.94 The Iranian regime also has combined its propaganda efforts 
against the US and Iraq, charging that US actions have hurt the Iraqi people as much as 
Baghdad's.95  
The role of Saudi Arabia is very significant in the possible success of Shia insurgencies, 
both because it borders the principal Shia areas of Iraq and because of Riyadh's 
opposition to Saddam Hussein (at least since 1990). However, the Saudis, always 
preoccupied with controlling their own Shias, have shown no inclination to support Shia 
rebellions in Southern Iraq. This was particularly true after reports surfaced that the 
Iranians were actively supporting the rebels.96  
Riyadh has faced its own problems with Saudi Shia. There have been two Shia uprisings 
in Saudi Arabia. The first, contemporaneous with the Iranian Revolution, occurred in 
November 1979. An estimated 90,000 demonstrators carrying portraits of Khomeini 
rioted during religious ceremonies, which were held despite being banned by the Saudi 
government. Riyadh moved a reported 20,000 troops to the province to restore order.97 
An unknown number of persons, reportedly including some National Guard soldiers, 
were killed during the unrest.98 Similar disturbances recurred in February 1980, when 
Shia demonstrated in commemoration of the anniversary of Khomeini's rise to power. 
There was considerable property damage during the riots, and four people reportedly 
were killed.99 These incidents, although relatively minor in overall stability, almost 
certainly have dissuaded the Saudi government from support of the Iraqi Shia. 
The final external actors in possible Shia insurgencies are the Western countries, 
primarily the US. Although the US has tried to craft an opposition movement to the Iraqi 
regime, Washington clearly has kept a considerable distance from the Shia insurgent 
groups. Shortly after the Gulf War, the allied coalition established both Iraqi no-fly zones 
and safe areas in northern Iraq to protect the Kurds. The Shia south initially was not 
offered such protection, and considerable time elapsed before a no-fly zone was 
established in the south. Despite the fact that some public discussion occurred regarding 
setting up Shia protected areas in the south, no decision to do so was actually ever made. 
At least in part, this was due to a US government assessment that the Shia would not 
succeed in their uprising.100  
In general, the US seemingly has maintained a hands-off policy toward the mainstream 
Shia opposition. Washington has supported some Shia political figures as part of the Iraqi 
National Congress, but these individuals do not have the same degree of influence among 
the Shia as some of the leaders of the SCIRI. Given the current state of US relations with 
Iran, and the nervousness of some American allies among the Gulf States regarding their 
Shia, it is very unlikely that any US administration will provide any significant support 
for a Shia-based insurgency.  
CONCLUSIONS AND PROSPECTS  
Shia insurgent operations, together with harsh government responses, have continued 
since the 1991 uprising. Most insurgent operations have reverted to the pre-1991 pattern 
of sporadic attacks against Iraqi government buildings, officials and small groups of 
security forces.101 More widespread unrest occasionally flares, such as that following the 
assassination of a senior Shia cleric and his sons in February 1999. Numerous protests 
reportedly erupted, with Iraqi security forces killing some of the protesters and arresting 
large numbers.102 The government reportedly routinely responds to potential unrest 
through torture and executions.103 Although insurgent operations and popular protests 
have ebbed and flowed, they generally have been controlled by the government. 
The Shia clearly are a group with insurgency potential within Iraq. Their proportion of 
the population and long-standing grievances provide a strong population base for 
mobilization against the regime. The events of 1991 emphasize this point, with virtually 
anomic violence with leaders scrambling to catch up. Unfortunately for their cause, 
however, the attempts at Shia insurgency demonstrate one central point: effective, severe 
repression can in fact work against an insurgency. The Iraqi regime's willingness to use 
extraordinarily brutal repressive measures, followed by the granting of some benefits to 
the Shia populace, thus far has been a successful strategy. It is highly probable that such a 
strategy will continue to succeed as long as the current regime maintains its other support 
bases. A severe weakening of the regime through Saddam's death, military coup or major 
external shock would likely reignite Shia opposition movements against a government 
with reduced repressive capabilities. Pending that eventuality, however, the status quo 
will probably remain. 
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